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YOU SAY INTRASTATE, I SAY INTERSTATE:
WHY WE SHOULD CALL THE
WHOLE THING OFF
Andrew Wiktor*
As society evolves, so do criminals. In the early twentieth century,
America embraced the automobile, passed the Volstead Act, and created a
national highway program. These developments inadvertently paved the way
for interstate criminal enterprise. Infamous gangsters such as Al Capone
were able to operate large-scale racketeering syndicates without fear of
being prosecuted for two primary reasons: (1) states lacked jurisdiction,
resources, or both to go after such criminals, and (2) there was no federal
criminal statute to fill the gap left by the states.
But as criminals evolve, so does society. In 1961, Congress, at the urging
of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, passed the Travel Act. This statute
makes it a federal crime to use interstate facilities to promote certain offenses
that would otherwise have amounted to only state-level crimes. The Travel
Act enumerates several crimes falling within its scope, including, but not
limited to, gambling, prostitution, arson, bribery, and extortion.
While the statute’s legislative history makes it clear that the Act targeted
gangsters like Capone who were using interstate facilities to conduct
interstate crimes, the Ninth Circuit has held that the federal government can
exercise its jurisdiction whenever a facility of interstate commerce is used,
even when that facility is used to facilitate wholly intrastate conduct.
Interstate facilities include automated teller machines (ATMs), banks, cars,
and cellphones, making the enumerated crimes in the Travel Act nearly
always chargeable by the federal government under this holding.
Given the potential breadth of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, this Note
considers whether the Travel Act’s jurisdictional interstate requirement can
be satisfied by the intrastate use of interstate facilities. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that while reading the Act’s scope to include wholly intrastate
activity may initially appear disconcerting, such an expansive interpretation
should be encouraged.
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INTRODUCTION
Alphonse Gabriel “Al” Capone smirked in a federal courtroom in Chicago,
Illinois on October 17, 1931, after a jury found him guilty of tax evasion.1
Although “[n]o one interviewed him” that day, it was evident Capone was
happy.2 America’s most recognizable gangster was not gleeful because he
had evaded the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for years before being caught;
instead, he was gleeful because he evaded a different, more serious charge:
racketeering.3
In fact, Capone was never charged with crimes such as murder, facilitating
prostitution, or gambling—the very offenses that led to his infamy.
Furthermore, for the better part of American history, crime bosses—like
Capone, Lucky Luciano, and George “Machine Gun Kelly” Barnes—were
able to run multistate racketeering syndicates safe from the prying eyes of
the federal government since these crimes were only chargeable as state
offenses. And even though state law enforcement agencies were legally
permitted to go after these notorious gangsters, they often did not because
such prosecutions were either outside of their jurisdictions or beyond their
investigatory capabilities. Thus, when Assistant United States Attorney
Jacob I. Grossman went after Capone, he indicted the country’s most wellknown crime boss with a less-than-glamorous federal offense: income tax
evasion.4
Capone’s income tax prosecution has been deemed “pretextual”—since
the government could not charge him for his most heinous behavior, it settled
for a lesser charge in hope of doing some justice.5 When prosecutors settle
for charging suspects with lesser crimes, however, it can be unsettling for the
general citizenry.6 Moreover, such prosecutions frequently expose larger

1. Meyer Berger, Capone Convicted of Dodging Taxes; May Get 17 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1931, at 1 (“As soon as the verdict was entered, [Capone] got out of his seat and
virtually ran from the room. He rushed on lumbering feet across the dim corridor, stepped
into the elevator and as soon as it touched the rotunda floor he ran out to the street to a waiting
automobile.”).
2. Id.
3. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2005)
(“[Capone’s] crimes were not easily proved in court. So federal prosecutors charged Capone
not with running illegal breweries or selling whiskey or even slaughtering rival mobsters, but
with failure to pay his income taxes.”).
4. At the time, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case had made it possible for the government
to hold criminals accountable for not paying taxes on the profits they derived from illegal
activities. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). See also generally Boris
I. Bittker, Taking Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 130 (1974)
(discussing the evolution of taxing illegal gains).
5. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 584.
6. See id. at 588 (describing that although Capone’s prosecution did not spark ire from
the public, more recent pretextual prosecutions—those of Bill Clinton and Martha Stewart, for
example—have stirred up criticism).
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systemic problems in the justice system,7 often indicating gaps in title 18 of
the United States Code.8
Capone was sentenced to eleven years in prison one week after his
conviction, a decision he was no longer smiling about and one he attempted
to vacate six years later.9 Still, his initial elation and the elation of other such
gangsters—men who quite literally got away with murder—prompted then–
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to propose criminal legislation, three
decades later, geared at wiping the grins off the faces of gangsters such as
Capone. On June 29, 1961, President John F. Kennedy passed the Travel
Act.10
While Attorney General Kennedy’s purpose for proposing the Travel Act
was narrowly geared toward crime bosses who operated illegal enterprises in
State A from the jurisdictionally safe confines of State B,11 the Act has been
interpreted more broadly than that.12 This is largely due to the potentially
wide-reaching clause in the first line of the statute, which covers anyone who
“travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce.”13 In fact, some courts have liberally
interpreted the “facility in interstate or foreign commerce” language,
upholding Travel Act charges based on the intrastate use of the mails,14
automated teller machines (ATMs),15 and telephones.16 While there is little
to no doubt that these facilities ought to be deemed facilities in interstate or
foreign commerce, it is far more questionable whether the mere use of such

7. Ken LaMance, The Dark Horses of Criminal Prosecution, LEGAL MATCH (Apr. 7,
2010),
https://lawblog.legalmatch.com/tag/pretextual-charges
[https://perma.cc/NLE9AMN9].
8. Congress can close “gap[s] in the authority of federal investigatory agencies” by using
its Commerce Clause power. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (noting that in
addition to the gaps that the Travel Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1952, intended to fill, Congress
also sought to provide the federal government with the ability to aid in the prosecution of two
other crimes traditionally prosecuted on the state level: kidnapping and the interstate
transportation of stolen automobiles).
9. See generally United States v. Capone, 93 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1937).
10. Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(2012)).
11. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 3 (1961) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“Only the Federal
Government can curtail the flow of funds which permit the kingpins to live far from the scene,
preventing the local officials, burdened by the gambling activity, from punishing him.”).
12. J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952,
Making It a Federal Offense to Use Interstate or Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of
Racketeering Enterprises, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 838 § 2[a] (1969) (“[T]he word ‘facility’ should not
be limited in its scope to travel or transportation facilities, but should be broadly construed to
also include communication and other facilities of all kinds.”).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1986).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1996).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2008).
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a facility satisfies the jurisdictional hook of the Travel Act.17 This is
especially true given twenty-first-century technology, where, for example,
Americans collectively check their cellphones eight billion times a day.18
This Note is primarily concerned with whether using a cellphone in an
entirely intrastate manner is enough to give the federal government
jurisdiction under the Travel Act.
Interestingly, only one circuit court has addressed this issue in the context
of the Travel Act, and it held that such use does create a sufficient
jurisdictional hook.19 While this Note is concerned with whether the wholly
intrastate use of a facility with interstate capabilities should satisfy the Travel
Act’s jurisdictional requirement, its scope will rely in part on a similarly
worded statute—the federal murder-for-hire statute20—where the case law is
more developed in an effort to compare these two federal laws. In both
contexts the ramifications are real, especially in a society where most people
can affect interstate commerce with the click of a button (or, more accurately,
the touch of a screen or command of a voice).
Part I of this Note explores the background of the Travel Act. It
commences with the Act’s roots in the Commerce Clause and analyzes the
text of the statute. This Part then turns to the legislative history of the Travel
Act and concludes with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act
in two cases from the 1970s.
Part II discusses the ways in which courts have analyzed the interstate
element specifically required by the Travel Act. This Part also breaks down
the case law surrounding the intrastate use of interstate facilities in the
context of the murder-for-hire statute,21 which, as noted, may help to
delineate the scope of the Travel Act’s interstate nexus requirement. This
Part concludes by examining what the murder-for-hire statute means for
Travel Act jurisprudence.
Finally, in Part III, this Note examines possible reasons why more courts
have not decided whether the intrastate use of an interstate facility can satisfy
the Travel Act. It concludes that if more courts decide this issue, they should
find that the intrastate use of an interstate facility does satisfy the Travel Act.
Though at first blush this may appear to be the federal government
17. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 368 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D. Md. 1973) (“The
law is unclear on what constitutes sufficient contact with interstate commerce to establish
jurisdiction under the Travel Act.”).
18. Lisa Eadicicco, Americans Check Their Phones 8 Billion Times a Day, TIME (Dec. 15,
2015), http://time.com/4147614/smartphone-usage-us-2015/ [https://perma.cc/6US6-DG9A].
19. Nader, 542 F.3d at 722.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012).
21. Id. Circuits once disagreed whether wholly intrastate use of an interstate facility
satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of the murder-for-hire statute. Compare United States
v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the intrastate use of a
facility of interstate commerce gives federal courts jurisdiction in the context of murder for
hire), with United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the
intrastate use of a cellphone only satisfies § 1958 if an interstate facility is utilized to complete
the communication). These decisions are particularly illuminating because of the similar
“interstate facility” language in both the murder-for-hire and Travel Act statutes.
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overstepping its reach, this Note, without outright contesting that notion,
explains why this is not a terribly worrisome outcome. It contends that the
potential for harm is minimal, and it provides two reasons why the benefits
outweigh the harm: (1) the Travel Act is an important, versatile statute that
permits a wide range of fair prosecutions, and (2) a more liberal interpretation
of the Travel Act’s jurisdictional reach will help prevent, for example,
nefarious health-care providers from running illegal kickback schemes that
state law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to prosecute. Thus, this Note
ultimately defends the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nader22
and shows why a broad reading of the Travel Act is not problematic.
I. THE TRAVEL ACT
The Travel Act was enacted with a narrow purpose23 but broad language.24
What makes this discrepancy even harder to reconcile is that in the years
following its inception, the Travel Act was one of federal prosecutors’ most
used tools.25 This Part explores this discrepancy by detailing where Congress
derived its authority when enacting the Travel Act,26 what role prepositions
in the text of the statute may (or may not) play,27 who was involved in the
statute’s legislative history,28 and how the Court has interpreted the Act.29
By proceeding in this order, this Part attempts to emulate how judges grapple
with challenging statutory questions.30 First, courts make sure there was
constitutional authority for Congress to act.31 Next, if such authority is
present, they look for ambiguity in the language of the text.32 Third, if the
language is not clear, they turn to other sources such as legislative history.33
In following this order, this Part systematically traces how courts have
approached the Travel Act.

22. 542 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008).
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See Barry Breen, The Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952): Prosecution of Interstate Acts
in Aid of Racketeering, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125, 125 (1986) (“Though only a few paragraphs
in length, it is nevertheless a mainstay of federal prosecutors.”); Michael Kendall, The Use of
State Statutes in Federal Corruption Prosecutions, 40 BOS. B.J. 10, 10 (1996) (“The statutes
that federal prosecutors most commonly use to prosecute state and local corruption are: the
Hobbs Act, § 666, the Travel Act, RICO, and the mail and wire fraud statutes.”).
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. See United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2008) (breaking down the
order in which courts interpret statutes).
31. It is not uncommon, however, for courts to forgo this step altogether. As noted in Part
I.A, there is no debate that Congress had authority to enact the Travel Act under the Commerce
Clause. Thus, many of the cases mentioned do not even address this threshold issue.
32. See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42–45 (1979).
33. See, e.g., id. at 45.
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A. Constitutional Hook: The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the right “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”34 Historically,
Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause has ebbed and
flowed. At times, the Court has given federal legislatures broad deference
under this clause;35 other times it has curbed this ability.36 At the time the
Travel Act was codified in 1961, the Court’s jurisprudence recognized that
Congress had broad reach under the Commerce Clause.
In Wickard v. Filburn,37 for example, the Court focused on the cumulative
effects an individual’s actions may have on the nation; if those effects could
affect interstate commerce, Congress was within its right to regulate.38 In
Wickard, a farmer exceeded his wheat-acreage allotment under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which was designed to “control the
volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid
surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat
prices and obstructions to commerce.”39 This federal statute was intended to
regulate the national wheat industry,40 but even though the farmer’s activity
was “local in character,”41 the Court found it was within Congress’s reach
under the Commerce Clause.42
Congress enjoyed great latitude with respect to the Commerce Clause for
over fifty years after Wickard was decided. The Court even reaffirmed the
Clause’s power and used it to support the civil rights movement in the
1960s,43 the same decade that the Travel Act was enacted. Thus, it is no
surprise that courts have routinely recognized that Congress was well within

34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. See, e.g., Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914)
(permitting Congress to invoke its Commerce Clause authority to regulate intrastate commerce
if it may impact interstate commerce).
36. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)
(requiring the activity to directly affect interstate commerce in order for Congress to have the
power to regulate it).
37. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. Id. at 133.
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 119.
42. Id. at 125 (“But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1964).
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its power when it used the Commerce Clause as the constitutional hook for
the Travel Act,44 despite several failed challenges.45
Even under the Court’s current, narrower Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, as articulated in United States v. Lopez,46 intrastate activity
remains within the reach of Congress.47 The question, however, is whether
Congress intended to do that when it passed the Travel Act or if the statute’s
language permits such broad application.48
B. The Text of the Travel Act
Seeing that Congress was within its authority when it enacted the Travel
Act, the next step in any sound statutory interpretation is to examine the text
of the statute and try to uncover its plain meaning.49 While one scholar has
remarked that the Travel Act “is a comparatively short criminal provision,”50
this does not necessarily mean such analysis will be straightforward.
Whatever the Travel Act may lack in length, it makes up for in ambiguity.
To be sure, though, part of the Act is clear. The statute makes certain that

44. United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1996) (defending Congress’s power
to “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce” (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995))); United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir.
1989) (finding that Congress has the power to regulate the intrastate use of the mails within
the context of the Travel Act); United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344, 352–53 (4th Cir.
1968) (explaining that Congress acted well within its power to regulate interstate activities
when enacting the Travel Act); United States v. De Sapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (“There is no doubt that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate transactions when
it is necessary for the protection of interstate commerce.”). In fact, in Attorney General
Kennedy’s testimony before the House of Representatives, which was later presented to the
Senate, he noted that “[i]t would be an exercise by the Congress of its plenary power over
interstate communications to aid the States in coping with organized gambling, by denying
the use of interstate communication facilities for such activities.” Hearings, supra note 11, at
6.
45. See Kemper, supra note 12, at 14 (“[I]t has been charged that [the Travel Act] is
beyond the powers of Congress under the commerce clause, and amounts to a usurpation of
powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment; that its language is vague, ambiguous,
and uncertain and thus its enforcement constitutes a denial of due process of law in violation
of the Fifth Amendment; that it makes arbitrary and unreasonable discriminations, also in
violation of the Fifth Amendment; that its application to interstate communications abridges
the freedom of speech guaranties of the First Amendment; and that it unconstitutionally
restricts travel, fails to adequately apprise a person of conduct which he must avoid, compels
a person to give testimony against himself, and imposes cruel and unusual punishment. Each
and all of these contentions have been rejected by the courts and it appears to be well setled
[sic] that § 1952 is a valid and lawful exercise by Congress of its broad powers over interstate
commerce.” (footnotes omitted)).
46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
47. Id. at 558 (“Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities.” (emphasis added)).
48. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We note at the outset that
this is a question of congressional intent, not congressional power. Nader and Lake correctly
do not contest that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate telephone calls.”); see also
Barry, 888 F.2d at 1095.
49. Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006).
50. Breen, supra note 25, at 125.
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the specific “illegal activity” enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)—crimes
that would otherwise be state violations—can be charged federally if the
commission of the act involves interstate commerce.51 Broadly, the statute
targets illegal gambling, prostitution, extortion, bribery, and arson,52 but it
can also reach other illegal activity, too.
The ambiguity—and, thus, the initial focal point of this Note—lies within
the first nineteen words of the Act: “Whoever travels in interstate or foreign
commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce . . . .”53 Jurists have disagreed about this language in at least two
significant ways.
In Holy Trinity Church v. United States,54 Justice David J. Brewer noted
that “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers.”55 While this is certainly true, it is also “elementary
that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed.”56 Thus, it is important to begin any
statutory analysis with the letters of the law. In the Travel Act, interestingly,
the words that have caused the most confusion have been prepositions.
1. Prepositional Problems: The Debate Between “In” and “Of”
The Eighty-Seventh Congress, which, to be sure, served after the SeventyThird Congress,57 used the preposition “in”—not the preposition “of”—to
51. The pertinent text of the statute reads as follows:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to . . .
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform [an enumerated act].
(b) As used in this section (i) “unlawful activity” means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been
paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the
Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the
State in which they are committed or of the United States, (2) extortion, bribery, or
arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States,
or (3) any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United
States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title and (ii) the term “State”
includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b) (2012).
52. Id. § 1952(b).
53. Id. § 1952(a).
54. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
55. Id. at 459.
56. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
57. The Seventy-Third Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a. Both of these
acts are founded upon “interstate commerce” language, but one uses the preposition “in,” see
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012), and the other uses the preposition “of,” see 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
Courts have tried to analogize the use of the prepositions “in” and “of” in the securities context
to argue that there is also a meaningful difference for Travel Act purposes. Sometimes this
has been successful; other times it has not.
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precede the words “interstate commerce.”58 The legislative history of the
Travel Act does not indicate that legislatures fretted much over this decision;
in fact, there is no indication that this was even a conscious decision.
Nonetheless, it has been the subject of litigation as some have argued such a
distinction is the difference between the Travel Act reaching wholly
intrastate activity and it not.
Defendants charged with Travel Act violations predicated upon wholly
intrastate use of an interstate facility have contended that the use of the word
“in” demonstrates that the facility must have actually been used in an
interstate manner. The argument continues: had Congress used the
preposition “of” to precede “interstate commerce,” the Travel Act would be
far broader and would reach any use of a facility with interstate capabilities,
whether used for an interstate purpose or not.
Some courts have mentioned this argument,59 some have heeded it,60 and
others have rejected it.61 Despite how courts come out on the issue, the
arguments presented usually involve case law from securities litigation. The
Securities Act of 1933 uses the preposition “in”62 whereas the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 uses the preposition “of.”63 In securities litigation,
“in” is construed more narrowly than “of,” which requires some interstate
activity.64 As noted above, in the context of the Travel Act this distinction
has been given credence by some courts65 but has also been rejected by
others.66
In United States v. Barry,67 for example, the court was trying to determine
whether intrastate use of the mails was punishable under the Travel Act.68
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Varbaro, 597 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
invalidated by United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1986). In Varbaro, the court
acknowledged that “[i]n the realm of securities regulation this difference in prepositions has
been used to distinguish between statutes requiring actual interstate activity (‘in’) and mere
intrastate use of an instrumentality of commerce which otherwise runs interstate (‘of’).” Id.
The court also noted that the word “of” was used in the House report on the Travel Act, which
demonstrates that “this discrepancy cautions against excessive reliance on a single
preposition.” Id. Thus, the Varbaro court found “[t]he statutory language appears to wrestle
itself to a draw,” and it rested its decision on the stated purpose of the act. Id. at 1176. Its
decision, however, was later overruled by the Second Circuit. United States v. Riccardelli, 794
F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1986).
60. See United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting the distinction
between the prepositions “in” and “of,” and holding that the Travel Act’s use of “in,”
consistent with the statute’s legislative history, should be read to require interstate use).
61. See United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2008).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
64. See Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473, 475–76 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(explaining that the Securities Act of 1933, which uses the preposition “in,” requires an actual
interstate communication); cf. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727–28 (8th Cir. 1967)
(explaining that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which uses the preposition “of,” can be
satisfied with the intrastate use of a facility).
65. See, e.g., Barry, 888 F.2d at 1095.
66. See, e.g., Nader, 542 F.3d at 719–20.
67. 888 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1989).
68. Id. at 1092; see also infra Part II.A.1.
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The court relied on the Interstate Incitement of Riot Act69 and the
aforementioned securities laws, and it was persuaded that the choice in
preposition mattered.70
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the prepositional
distinction as it appeared in the context of securities laws.71 There, the court
explained that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 were “unrelated statutes not at issue.”72 While it found the application
of the securities acts unpersuasive, the court did give credence to the
prepositional distinction in the federal murder-for-hire statute,73 which was
“closely related to the Travel Act.”74 There, the court acknowledged that the
murder-for-hire statute, as originally enacted, contained a discrepancy
between § 1958(a), which used the preposition “in,” and its definitional
section, § 1958(b), which used the preposition “of.”75 The Nader court
explained that Congress rectified this asymmetry when it passed an
amendment in 2004. In this amendment, Congress purported to clarify the
definitional portion of the statute (§ 1958(b)); interestingly, though, it did so
by changing the substantive section (§ 1958(a)).76 From this, the Ninth
Circuit gleaned that the prepositions “in” and “of” were always intended to
be interchangeable, as Congress clarified the definition by altering the
substance.77 Since the murder-for-hire statute was “closely related” to the
Travel Act, the court ultimately held that the prepositions were similarly
interchangeable under the Travel Act.78
Adding to the uncertainty surrounding the importance (or lack thereof) of
the “in” versus “of” distinction are two murder-for-hire cases that preceded
the 2004 amendment.79 The Sixth Circuit, for example, struggled to rectify
the use of “in” in § 1958(a) with the use of “of” in § 1958(b).80 In United
States v. Weathers,81 however, there was enough of an interstate hook to
allow the court to skirt the issue, but the court expounded on the lack of
clarity regarding the differing prepositions and urged Congress to clarify its
intent.82 Two years later, when the Fifth Circuit sat en banc to determine the

69. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2012).
70. Barry, 888 F.2d at 1095 (“[A] statute that speaks in terms of an instrumentality in
interstate commerce rather than an instrumentality of interstate commerce is intended to apply
to interstate activities only.”).
71. See Nader, 542 F.3d at 719.
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012).
74. Nader, 542 F.3d at 719.
75. Id. at 720.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. For a more detailed discussion on this case and its import, see infra Part II.A.3.
79. See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States
v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999).
80. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342.
81. 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 342–43.
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jurisdictional scope of the murder-for-hire statute, it waved off the “in”
versus “of” distinction as insignificant.83
The sum of the case law surrounding this prepositional difference is that
there is no consensus as to how much, if any, significance ought to be
attributed to Congress’s use of the word “in” in the Travel Act.84
2. A Second Language Debate: Is It a Modified Noun
or a Modified Verb?
A second linguistic debate centers on whether the prepositional phrase “in
interstate or foreign commerce” modifies the noun “facility” or the verb
“uses.” The implications of the answer cannot be overstated. If the
prepositional phrase modifies the noun “facility,” this means that the facility
merely needs to be one that can be used in interstate commerce. Such a
reading is far-reaching, and it would certainly cover wholly intrastate
activity. This means whenever one drives an automobile, withdraws money
from an ATM, dials a phone, or uses a computer, they risk violating the
Travel Act.85 Conversely, if the phrase modifies the verb “uses,” this would
require that the facility must actually be used in an interstate manner that
affects interstate commerce. Such a reading, therefore, is far narrower, and
it would not cover wholly intrastate activity. This, though, is not much of a
debate, as “[n]o court has held that the phrase ‘in interstate or foreign
commerce’ modifies [the verb] ‘uses.’”86
In Nader, the Ninth Circuit examined cases where other circuits had
upheld Travel Act violations where the alleged “interstate” activity was
performed entirely within one state.87 From this, the court extrapolated that
the noun “facility” necessarily was being modified by the prepositional
phrase “in interstate or foreign commerce.”88 The court cleverly explained
that it would have been impossible for other circuits, such as the Second,
Fifth, and Eighth, to have concluded that wholly intrastate activity was within
the reach of the Travel Act had the prepositional phrase modified the verb,

83. Marek, 238 F.3d at 320.
84. Notably, these are not the only contexts in which the “in” versus “of” distinction has
been addressed. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 844(e), which prevents people from using a
telephone to threaten or injure members or damage or destroy property of religious
synagogues, uses the preposition “of,” which only requires the use of an instrument of
interstate commerce. See United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 2004). This
was compared to § 844(i), which has the preposition “in” and does require an actual interstate
use. Id.
85. This, of course, presumes one is using one of these facilities to further an “illegal
activity” enumerated in the Travel Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b) (2012).
86. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2008).
87. See id.
88. Id. (“While these cases involve facilities other than the telephone, their holdings
require a grammatical construction of the Travel Act that forecloses Nader and Lake’s
interpretation. That the cases arise under different circumstances does not render them any
less applicable here, since the phrase ‘in interstate or foreign commerce’ modifies the same
word no matter the facts of the case.”).
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which would have necessitated interstate use of the facility.89 It seems there
is little debate that “in interstate or foreign commerce” modifies the noun.
C. Legislative History
Once there is ambiguity in the text of a statute, courts often turn to the
legislative history to glean insight from the process that put the law into
effect. How and why a law came about is often indicative of its appropriate
interpretation. This section first looks at the purpose of the Travel Act. It
then analyzes statements by two key proponents of the Act. Finally, it
examines how courts have used the legislative history of the Travel Act when
analyzing cases.
1. The Purpose of the Travel Act
As previously noted, Al Capone was indicted, convicted, and sentenced
for income tax evasion, not racketeering.90 Although the public speculated
about Capone’s involvement in, for example, the St. Valentine’s Day
Massacre,91 and it was largely taken as fact that Capone was a full-time
gangster who derived millions of dollars from his various illegal
enterprises,92 the government never charged him with the crimes for which
he was best known. Law enforcement often did not have the requisite
evidence because of how careful Capone was,93 but this was not the only
restraint: at the time, there was no federal statute geared at stopping
racketeering, so prosecuting mobsters who operated dangerous criminal
syndicates was left entirely to the states.
Though arguably the most well-known, Capone was not the only gangster
in the first half of the twentieth century getting away with murder.94 Thus,
cross state gangsters were a problem of national proportions. Congress
finally intervened in the early 1960s with legislation that provided the federal
government with its first tool to help state law enforcement crack down on
gangsters who ran multistate criminal enterprises.95 Although the legislative
89. See id.
90. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
91. Elizabeth Nix, History Stories: 8 Things You Should Know About Al Capone,
HISTORY (May 5, 2015), http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/8-things-you-shouldknow-about-al-capone [https://perma.cc/9FQ6-8QBV]. The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre,
which took place on February 14, 1929, and involved the execution of seven men with ties to
one of Capone’s rival gangs, remains unsolved. Id.
92. Id.
93. Josh Clark, Why Was Tax Evasion the Only Thing Pinned on Al Capone?, HOW STUFF
WORKS,
https://history.howstuffworks.com/history-vs-myth/capone-tax-evasion1.htm
[https://perma.cc/KMW6-Z2LX] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
94. See generally Mafia in the United States, HISTORY (Oct. 22, 2009),
http://www.history.com/topics/mafia-in-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/3ZBJ-W9RW]
(listing leaders of organized crime groups).
95. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971) (“Legislative history of the Act is
limited, but does reveal that § 1952 was aimed primarily at organized crime and, more
specifically, at persons who reside in one State while operating or managing illegal activities
located in another.”).
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history is limited,96 it reveals Congress’s main target: well-known gangsters
operating criminal syndicates across state lines.97
2. Statements Made by Key Proponents of the Travel Act
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy wanted to rid the country of
organized crime.98 In fact, a year before his congressional testimony pushing
for criminal legislation that would make it far more challenging to be a
gangster in America, Kennedy espoused his concern in The Enemy Within, a
book he authored detailing the pitfalls of relying solely on local law
enforcement to stop organized crime.99 As the attorney general, Kennedy
put his ideas into action.
On May 17, 1961, Kennedy testified before Subcommittee Number 5 of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, and, a few weeks later, he presented
that testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.100 Kennedy’s
testimony cited different reports101 that indicated organized crime was a
rampant problem.102 Specifically, Kennedy made it clear that his proposed
legislation was concerned with interstate gambling.103 He did not mention
any gangsters by name—likely because he was creating a public record and
did not want to jeopardize any ongoing investigations—but he did recount
specific activities and noted that they were being carried out by “[s]ome
notorious individuals, whose names you would immediately recognize.”104
Kennedy explained that although most people at the time thought of
gambling as local in nature—for example, placing a sports bet with the
neighborhood bookie—it was actually often a nationwide enterprise.105
Bookies, he explained, would “reinsure” one another to balance their books;
to do so, they would rely on a large network of sophisticated bookmakers

96. Breen, supra note 25, at 126 (noting the Act’s “sparse legislative history”).
97. Annotation, Interstate Travel as Element of Offense Established by Travel Act (18
U.S.C.A. § 1952), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 251 § 2 (1984) (“[The Travel Act] was intended to strike a
blow at the interrelated network of criminals whose influence and activities extended over
state and national borders. The statute was designed to assist local law enforcement officials
whose work was often impeded by the interstate nature of syndicate-controlled criminal
activity.”); see Kemper, supra note 12, at 13 (“[T]he principal thrust of the statute was directed
against ‘syndicate’ members who reap rich profits from various forms of racketeering but
remain immune from local prosecution by living outside the state of actual operation of such
illegal ‘business enterprises.’”).
98. See Martin R. Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s Legislative Program to
Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOK. L. REV. 37, 37 (1961).
99. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 263 (1960) (calling for a “national crime
commission” to aggregate data on “leading gangsters”).
100. Hearings, supra note 11, at 1 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the
United States).
101. Id. at 2 (referring to the Kefauver investigation, New York State Commission on
Investigation, and General Investigating Committee to the House of Representatives of the
Fifty-Seventh Legislature of Texas).
102. See, e.g., id. (explaining “the rape of the city of Beaumont by organized crime”).
103. Id. (“The main target of our bill is interstate travel to promote gambling.”).
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 2–3.

2018]

YOU SAY INTRASTATE, I SAY INTERSTATE

1337

who would buy risk from one another.106 This occurred across state lines.107
Additionally, Kennedy discussed how taking bets on horseracing in America,
which at the time took place at “20 major racetracks throughout the
country,”108 required various forms of interstate communication.109 It was
evident, and acknowledged by Kennedy himself, that as attorney general he
wanted to prevent crime bosses from running illegal enterprises in State A
from the safe confines of State B.110 The proposed legislation, Kennedy
argued, would “curtail [crime syndicates’] use of interstate communications”
and “inflict a telling blow to their operations.”111 And it seems to have done
that and more.112 Though the Travel Act was “acknowledged by RFK as his
most controversial legislative proposal,” it was also “the signature
achievement of his attorney generalship.”113
While the Travel Act was passed relatively quickly, it underwent several
changes while it was still a bill.114 One of the changes involved the scope of
the law. Senator Kenneth Keating of New York and other members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee were concerned that the bill was too narrow in
scope, and they wanted to extend its reach.115 Accordingly, this contingent
wrote a report to the Senate asking for broader, more encompassing
language.116 While the exact language they proposed was not used verbatim,
the idea of extending the reach was applied.
Part of the reason Senator Keating wanted the Act to be worded broadly
was his fear that criminals would find a way around the law.117 He had even
previously tried to introduce far-reaching legislation that would have

106. By Kennedy’s estimates, gambling involved over 70,000 people and was more than a
$7 billion industry. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 5–6 (mentioning that bookies communicated the winners of races “by telegraph
ticker tape, by telephone, or even by radio or television broadcast” to prevent bettors from
placing bets on a horse that already won without a bookie in another state realizing the race
had concluded).
110. Id. at 4 (“[O]ur information reveals numerous instances where the prime mover in a
gambling or other illegal enterprise operates by remote control from the safety of another
State—sometimes half a continent away.”); see also Pollner, supra note 98, at 39.
111. Hearings, supra note at 11, at 11.
112. See Adam Harris Kurland, The Travel Act at Fifty: Reflections on the Robert F.
Kennedy Justice Department and Modern Federal Criminal Law Enforcement at Middle Age,
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013).
113. Id. at 48.
114. For a more detailed discussion of the ins and outs of the statute’s language evolution,
see generally Pollner, supra note 98.
115. Part of this concern was that sports gambling was influenced greatly by organized
crime, and Senator Keating wanted to make sure the Travel Act was crafted in a manner such
that it would be able to address this concern. See United States v. Perrin, 444 U.S. 37, 46
(1979).
116. 107 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1961) (statement of Sen. Keating).
117. Hearings, supra note 11, at 259 (statement of Sen. Keating) (“[A]ll these gamblers
will do if this statute is passed is send the proceeds through the mail . . . .”); see also United
States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1093 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d
829, 833 (2d Cir. 1986).
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criminalized conspiracies to engage in organized crime.118 Ultimately, a
broader version than was originally proposed was passed by the Senate and
the House, but it is worth noting that Senator Keating warned that “there is
still some danger that the bill will not be as inclusive as is necessary to be
completely effective.”119
3. Treatment of Legislative History by the Courts
Early into the Travel Act’s existence, a district court evaluated the
legislative history of the Act. In United States v. De Sapio,120 the court
focused on the national concern that Attorney General Kennedy addressed in
his letter to Congress and noted the “far-flung criminal activities” that
Kennedy sought to weed out.121 Moreover, the court quoted language from
the report of the House Committee: “The interstate tentacles of this octopus
known as ‘organized crime’ or ‘the syndicate’ can only be cut by making it
a Federal offense to use the facilities of interstate commerce in the carrying
on of these nefarious activities.”122 The court concluded that the activity that
Congress intended to criminalize had to itself be interstate.123
The Second Circuit, however, curtailed the De Sapio opinion twenty-five
years later. In United States v. Riccardelli,124 the court reached the issue of
whether intrastate use of the U.S. mails satisfies the Travel Act.125 The court
found that “any use of the United States mails” was enough to invoke federal
jurisdiction under the Travel Act.126 In so holding, the court stressed Senator
Keating’s concern that the original Travel Act language was not far-reaching
enough,127 and it noted how the mails were singled out in the final language
that was adopted by Congress.128
While the Sixth Circuit in Barry was “reluctant to disagree with the
distinguished panel of a sister circuit” (i.e., the Second Circuit in
Riccardelli),129 it nevertheless reached the opposite conclusion regarding
whether any use of the mails could satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of
the Travel Act.130 The Barry court also relied on the legislative history, and
118. Hearings, supra note 11, at 95 (statement of Sen. Keating). The language in this
proposed piece of legislation clearly would have criminalized the mere act of depositing
something in the mail, even if it were never shipped. Since the language of that bill was
notably broader than the language of the Travel Act, at least one court has interpreted this as
a concession on Senator Keating’s part to make the Travel Act narrower than his conspiracy
bill. Barry, 888 F.2d at 1094.
119. 107 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1961) (statement of Sen. Keating).
120. 299 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121. Id. at 448.
122. Id. (quoting H. REP. NO. 87-966, at 3 (1961)).
123. Id.
124. 794 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1986).
125. See id. at 830. For a more detailed discussion on how courts have treated the intrastate
use of the mails under the Travel Act, see infra Part II.A.1.
126. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d at 830.
127. Id. at 832.
128. Id. at 833.
129. United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1096 (6th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 1095.
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it, too, noted that Congress expanded the Travel Act’s reach while it traversed
the judiciary committees.131 Still, it explained that “Congress never stated
or indicated an intention to include purely intrastate activities within its
ambit.”132 The court went further, noting that Congress would have used a
disjunctive “or” before the words “including the mail” if it intended to also
reach the intrastate use of the mails.133 And, in parsing Senator Keating’s
concern, the court noted that he was merely concerned that the original
language of the Travel Act would have been limited to physical travel; thus,
his concern was to include the mails to prevent gangsters from finding a
clever way around the federal criminal statute.134
Though the two aforementioned competing readings of the legislative
history are certainly interesting, the Ninth Circuit in Nader was unpersuaded
by either.135 In Nader, the court relied primarily on the text of the statute.
While the court acknowledged that “[t]he primary legislative purpose of the
Travel Act was to target organized crime,”136 it also pointed out that
organized crime was not at issue in the case before it as the Travel Act is
“worded broadly.”137 Because of this discrepancy, the Ninth Circuit did not
appear to accord the legislative history much weight.
Since the Travel Act was enacted, the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed
the reach of statute in depth twice, both in the 1970s.
4. The Supreme Court Case Law on the Travel Act
In Rewis v. United States,138 the petitioners were convicted for violating
the Travel Act because of a lottery they ran in their home state of Florida.139
Although the lottery operated wholly within Florida and “there [wa]s no
evidence that [petitioners] at any time crossed state lines in connection with
the operation of their lottery,” it was run a few miles from the state border,
and it attracted patronage from Georgia residents.140 The Fifth Circuit found
for the government and held that the petitioners were responsible for their
customers’ interstate travel.141
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, noting that holding petitioners
responsible for the interstate travel of other citizens would make for “an
expansive Travel Act [that] would alter sensitive federal-state
relationships.”142 The Court concluded that both the language of the text and
131. Id. at 1096.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1094. Impliedly, here the Sixth Circuit seems to adopt the position that not only
must the use of the mails be interstate in nature, but so must the use of any interstate facility.
134. See id.
135. See generally United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008).
136. Id. at 720.
137. Id. at 721.
138. 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
139. Id. at 810.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 810–11.
142. Id. at 812.
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its legislative history did not support such a broad interpretation of the Act.143
While some commentators have remarked that the Rewis Court indicated that
the Travel Act should be interpreted narrowly,144 others have recognized the
Rewis holding could be viewed more broadly.145
Less than a decade after Rewis, the Court heard another case that
questioned the Travel Act’s scope: Perrin v. United States.146 This case,
however, did not deal with the interstate element. Instead, the issue was
whether Congress intended to use the generic meaning of “bribery” in the
Travel Act—a meaning that would be more expansive because it would
include commercial (i.e., private) bribery—or the common-law version,
which would limit “bribery” to acts that concerned public officials.147 The
government, of course, argued for the broader, generic meaning, and the
defendant, naturally, argued for the narrower common-law meaning.148
This time, the Court found for the government—it was persuaded that
Congress, though silent on the issue, intended the more generic reading that
had largely been accepted across the nation when the Travel Act was
codified.149 In contrast to Rewis, commentators have contended that the
Perrin Court “opted for a more expansive interpretation of the Travel
Act.”150 Others, though, read Perrin as merely holding that Congress did not
intend to limit Travel Act prosecutions to bribery involving public
officials.151
These two Court cases are somewhat at odds with one another in how they
interpret the breadth of the Travel Act, though this discrepancy is hardly
irreconcilable. While the Rewis Court was certainly concerned with the
federalism tension accentuated by the Travel Act, it seemed more worried
about convicting defendants who had not purposefully enticed out-of-state
patrons to partake in their lottery. And though the Perrin Court applied the
generic definition of bribery and certainly did not want to hamper the Travel
Act’s utility for federal prosecutors, it seemed more focused about ruling on
one enumerated crime than expounding on the breadth of the entire Act.
Thus, both cases are likely best read as being confined to their specific
facts,152 and they ought not be taken as a clear indication of how narrowly or
broadly the statute needs to be read, much less about when the interstate hook
is satisfied. There is disagreement about the scope of the Travel Act no
matter whether the text, legislative history, or Court precedent is being
143. Id.
144. Steven G. Shapiro, Travel Act, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1987).
145. Breen, supra note 25, at 147.
146. 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
147. See id. at 41–45.
148. See id. at 42.
149. See id. at 48–49.
150. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 736 (arguing further that “Perrin thus dismissed the
argument expressed in Rewis that federalism concerns require a narrow interpretation of the
Travel Act.”).
151. See Breen, supra note 25, at 140–41.
152. In fact, the Perrin Court seemed to indicate this should be the case with the Rewis
opinion. See Perrin, 444 U.S. at 50.
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analyzed. Therefore, it is important to go further and look to how lower
courts have grappled with the Act to understand the arguments regarding its
jurisdictional scope.
II. THE TRAVEL ACT CASE LAW: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE
INTRASTATE ARGUMENTS
While interstate activity such as physically traveling across state lines
satisfies the Travel Act’s jurisdictional hook without issue,153 courts are less
clear on how much the interstate activity actually needs to help further the
crime.154 Though travel subsequent to the commission of the crime is
insufficient to trigger the Travel Act across jurisdictions,155 it is less clear
when crimes such as bribery are concluded. At the epicenter of this Note,
however, is whether an activity is, in fact, interstate.156 One court has
remarked that “[t]he law is unclear on what constitutes sufficient contact with
interstate commerce to establish jurisdiction under the Travel Act,”157 and
this is illustrated by the divergent conclusions courts have reached when
determining whether an activity is interstate.
A. When “Intrastate” Does and Does Not Mean “Interstate”
This section examines how courts have decided whether the intrastate use
of certain facilities with interstate capabilities permits the federal government
to charge a defendant under the Travel Act.
1. The Mails
One would be hard-pressed to argue that the United States Postal Service
is not an interstate facility, considering that mail can be sent across state lines.
But does a letter sent and received wholly within one state to further an illegal
153. See generally, e.g., United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding
the appellant’s trip from Arkansas to Chicago was critical to the success of a scheme to bribe
the Illinois Secretary of State, rendering federal jurisdiction based on the Travel Act
appropriate); United States v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1978) (upholding an
indictment under the Travel Act because the defendant had to travel to another state in order
to bribe a bank official).
154. See generally, e.g., United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
interstate travel must be significant to the commission of the crime, and it cannot be incidental
or minimal); United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying a narrow
approach for determining when interstate activity satisfies the jurisdictional hook); United
States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that interstate travel that is
essential or significant to the carrying on of the illegal activity is within the reach of the Travel
Act).
155. See generally, e.g., United States v. Botticello, 422 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding
that extortion followed by travel was beyond the reach of the Travel Act).
156. Although how much the interstate activity must help facilitate the illegal activity is an
interesting and important component of the Travel Act, it is not the focal point of this Note.
To decide whether the interstate activity aided in the commission of the crime or was too
tenuous to serve as a jurisdictional hook presumes the conduct itself was interstate. For a
collection of cases that evaluate nuanced fact patterns to determine whether activity is within
the reach of the Travel Act, see generally Annotation, supra note 97.
157. United States v. Anderson, 368 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D. Md. 1973).
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activity enumerated in the Travel Act make the sender susceptible to a federal
prosecution? And what should courts make of the Travel Act’s specific
reference to “the mail”?158 These questions have led to a minor split in
authority at the circuit level.
The Sixth Circuit does not believe that sending a piece of mail wholly
within one state is enough to trigger the Travel Act. In Barry, the court
acknowledged that “the text of the [Travel] Act extends its coverage far
beyond that indicated by its title”159 but determined that the Act was not
meant to cover “purely intrastate activities.”160 In reaching this conclusion,
the court analyzed the language of a different bill proposed by Senator
Keating that would have criminalized the act of depositing a letter in the
mail.161 Because that bill, which failed to become law, used the word “or”
to describe acts covered by the bill that were not necessarily interstate in
nature, the court stated that, under the proposed bill, wholly intrastate activity
would have been covered. Here, however, Senator Keating did not include
the disjunctive “or” in his proposed language, which in part led the court to
conclude that wholly intrastate activity was not to be covered by the Travel
Act.162
The Barry court was also concerned with federalism issues, and it cited
Attorney General Kennedy’s insistence that the Travel Act was meant to aid
local law enforcement, not usurp its power.163 Moreover, to read the statute
in accord with its legislative history, the court gave credence to the “in”
versus “of” distinction164 and found the use of mails was only intended to
cover interstate activities.165 Finally, in bolstering its conclusion, the court
noted that the rule of lenity also compelled it to hold that intrastate use of the
mails is not covered by the Travel Act.166
Conversely, though, the Second Circuit believes any use of the mail—
intrastate or interstate—satisfies the Travel Act’s jurisdictional requirement.
In Riccardelli, the court upheld bribery convictions where the defendant
approved inspection certificates that were later sent via the mail from
Manhattan to Brooklyn, wholly within the state of New York.167 The court’s
analysis was grounded in large part in the U.S. Constitution, which granted
the federal government the right to control the mail.168 Thus, the court called
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (covering anyone who “travels in interstate or foreign
commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce”).
159. United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1092 (6th Cir. 1989). The full title of the
Travel Act is “Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises.”
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
160. Barry, 888 F.2d at 1092–93.
161. Id. at 1094. Keating’s proposed bill used the following language: “deliver for
shipment or transport in interstate commerce any article, or deposit in the mail or deliver by
mail any letter [or] package . . . .” Hearings, supra note 11, at 95 (statement of Sen. Keating).
162. Barry, 888 F.2d at 1094.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
165. See Barry, 888 F.2d at 1095.
166. Id. at 1096.
167. United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d 829, 830 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986).
168. Id. at 831.
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the defendant’s use of the term “intrastate mails” an “oxymoronic
juxtaposition.”169
Moreover, the Riccardelli court highlighted that the phrase “including the
mail” was specifically referenced because it was to receive special treatment;
since the mails are inherently federal, using them invokes federal jurisdiction
regardless of the intrastate destination of the material being mailed.170 The
court also noted that, despite roughly seven hundred pages of legislative
history, there is no indication that Congress required the use of the mail to be
interstate in nature.171 In direct contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the Second
Circuit found that wholly intrastate use of the mail does satisfy the Travel
Act’s interstate requirement.172
2. Banks and ATMs
Some courts have also permitted federal prosecutors to establish the
jurisdictional hook when banks and ATMs are used to distribute proceeds of
the illegal activity. For example, in United States v. Wechsler,173 partners in
a real estate group were convicted of bribery based on the deposit of a check
in a bank, which the court found was a facility in interstate or foreign
commerce.174 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Baker,175 held
that forcing another to use an ATM fell “squarely within the literal language
of the Travel Act.”176
In United States v. Isaacs,177 however, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with
the Wechsler court. Though the Isaacs court ultimately affirmed a conviction
of a former state governor and his director of revenue, it expressly disagreed
that a Travel Act violation could stand simply because a federal bank was
used to deposit a bribe.178

169. Id.
170. Id. This argument separates the mails from other interstate facilities. Although not
explicitly stated in the opinion, this impliedly assumes that all other activity that uses an
interstate facility other than the mails must be interstate in nature to satisfy the Travel Act. If
it was purely intrastate, under the Riccardelli logic it would not be enough to sustain the Travel
Act’s jurisdictional requirement.
171. Id. at 832.
172. Id. at 834.
173. 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1968).
174. Id. at 347; see also United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1290 (4th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the use of the banks is sufficient when the predicate offense is gambling).
175. 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 276.
177. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
178. Id. at 1149 (“We are unable to agree with [the Wechsler court’s] view of § 1952,
however, not only because it assumes that the use of a single check crossing state lines may
trigger § 1952, but also because it suggests that the check need not actually travel interstate.
We cannot agree that the incidental use of a federally regulated banking facility furnishes the
jurisdictional element of a § 1952 offense.”).
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3. Telephones
Tina Nader and Marilyn Lake ran two prostitution businesses, disguised
as massage studios, in Montana from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.179
Together, these businesses had roughly five thousand customers from both
Montana and at least five other states.180 Nader and Lake used telephone
calls to procure at least some of their patrons,181 but “there [wa]s no evidence
of any calls that crossed state lines.”182 The issue before the court, therefore,
was whether wholly intrastate phone calls can violate the Travel Act.183
The court, in deciding this question of first impression, held that such calls
could—and did—violate the Travel Act.184 The court addressed whether the
prepositional phrase “in interstate or foreign commerce” modifies the noun
“facility” or the verb “uses.”185 Since Congress included the word “in” next
to “facility” and not “uses,” the court found that the word was intended to
modify the noun.186 This, then, indicates that the facility has to be one in
interstate commerce; its use, however, does not. The court bolstered its
finding by looking to other circuits: the court noted that of all of its sister
circuits that had interpreted the Travel Act, none of them found that the
preposition “in” modified the verb “uses.”187 Further, the court looked to
other circuits that had interpreted the murder-for-hire statute, which has
“nearly identical language.”188
While the court was comfortable supporting its position by comparing the
Travel Act to another criminal statute, it was unwilling to give any weight to
the “in” versus “of” distinction used in securities litigation because the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were
“unrelated” and “not at issue.”189 In fact, the court noted that, in the context
of the murder-for-hire statute, three circuits had determined that the “in”
versus “of” distinction was innocuous.190 Thus, the court found that
“intrastate telephone calls involve the use of a facility ‘in’ interstate
commerce.”191

179. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2008).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 715–16.
183. Id. at 716.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 717.
186. Id. at 717–18.
187. Id. at 718. Here, the court cited the mail and ATM cases discussed above, noting that
other circuits had found the intrastate use of these facilities was sufficient for a Travel Act
violation. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the only way those courts could have reached those
conclusions was if the word “in” modified “facility” and noted that “[w]hile these cases
involve facilities other than the telephone, their holdings require a grammatical construction
of the Travel Act that forecloses Nader and Lake’s interpretation.” Id.
188. Id. For a deeper discussion on the similarities between the Travel Act and murderfor-hire language, see infra Part II.B.
189. Nader, 542 F.3d at 719.
190. Id. at 720.
191. Id.
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The court also briefly dismissed some of the defendants’ other arguments.
First, although the Travel Act was intended to target organized crime, it was
“worded broadly” enough to encompass other forms of criminal activity.192
Second, since the court dispelled any argument that the Travel Act was
ambiguous, the rule of lenity—a rule that requires courts to construe vague
or unclear criminal statutes in favor of defendants—did not apply.193 Finally,
the court found there was not a federalism concern because the federal
government was merely helping states fight crime, not usurping the state
government’s power to do so.194
Interestingly, the Nader decision has been cited in nearly seventy cases
since it was written in 2008.195 Of those, only nine even mention the Travel
Act.196 In one such case, a Ninth Circuit panel explained that the Nader court
reached its broad, sweeping decision because of the word “facility,” which
permitted the Travel Act to reach further than statutes without such
language.197 In United States v. Wright,198 however, the court declined to
extend that in the context of another statute that did not have the word
“facility” in it.199 It has been far more common for cases to use Nader for its
statutory interpretation language rather than its Travel Act holding.200
Still, this is not to say Nader is an anomaly. A district court from the Fifth
Circuit has used the Nader opinion for its holding that wholly intrastate use
of a telephone can violate the Travel Act.201 That court, however, noted that
“[w]hile the Fifth Circuit has not specifically declared that an intrastate
telephone call may implicate federal jurisdiction under [the] Travel Act, it
has not conclusively ruled out the possibility.”202 Similarly, a district court
in the Fourth Circuit relied on Nader’s contention that using a telephone
192. Id. at 721.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 722.
195. A Westlaw search conducted on November 1, 2018, indicated that Nader had been
cited sixty-seven times in cases. A LexisNexis search conducted the same day indicated the
case had been cited sixty-nine times in cases.
196. This figure is based on the sixty-seven Westlaw cases.
197. United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 594 (9th Cir. 2010).
198. 625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010).
199. Id. (“By contrast, section 2252A(a)(1) [of a child pornography statute] does not
include the word ‘facility.’ Thus, the phrase ‘in interstate or foreign commerce’ modifies the
actus reus proscribed in the statute—mailing, transporting or shipping child pornography.
Unlike the Travel Act, section 2252A(a)(1)’s jurisdictional element is focused not on the
means the defendant uses to mail, transport, or ship child pornography, and its connection to
interstate commerce. Rather, it requires that the defendant mail, transport, or ship child
pornography interstate.”).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1354–55 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nader
for its description of the rule of lenity); United States v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citing Nader to illustrate that statutes should be “interpreted harmoniously” with
their legislative history and for its description of the rule of lenity); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v.
Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Nader for the proposition that similar statutes
should be interpreted harmoniously).
201. See United States v. Procell, No. 13-031-JJB, 2013 WL 5701495, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct.
17, 2013).
202. Id. This opinion, however, has not been cited by any court as of November 1, 2018,
according to Westlaw.
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within one state can support the interstate hook required by the Travel Act to
uphold an indictment.203 But these are the only two cases that have relied on
Nader for its main holding. When the Second Circuit cited Nader in United
States v. Halloran204 to prove the Travel Act’s jurisdictional element was
satisfied, it did so as a belt-and-suspenders move, not out of necessity; there,
the defendant had made interstate calls, so it appears the court was merely
demonstrating the Travel Act’s potentially far reach.205
Decades before Nader and mere years after the Travel Act was passed,
Judge Charles Miller Metzner of the Southern District of New York held, in
De Sapio, that telephone calls must actually be interstate to violate the Travel
Act.206 To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the very securities laws
that Nader deemed inapposite.207 Moreover, no other circuit has decided one
way or the other whether wholly intrastate phone calls satisfy the Travel Act.
Circuits have, however, reached the issue with regard to the federal murderfor-hire statute.
B. Evaluating “Interstate Facility” by Analogy: Statutory Interpretation
of the Murder-for-Hire Statute
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1958, it is a federal crime to “travel[] in or cause[]
another (including the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce, or use[] or cause[] another (including the intended victim) to use
the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a
murder be committed.”208 This is often referred to as the federal murder-forhire statute, and its “interstate facility” language closely mirrors the language
in the Travel Act.209 While, as discussed above, only one circuit court has
determined whether the interstate element of the Travel Act is satisfied by
wholly intrastate use of an interstate facility, more circuits have ruled on this
same matter as it pertains to the murder-for-hire statute. At the turn of the
twenty-first century, there appeared to be a circuit split as to whether a wholly
intrastate activity could satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1958. This, however, was
resolved by a 2004 amendment to that statute, and subsequent cases have
held, under the new language, that intrastate activity can satisfy the statute.

203. United States v. Crawford, No. MJG-15-0322, 2016 WL 4662334, at *4 (D. Md. Sept.
7, 2016). No court has cited this case as of November 1, 2018, according to Westlaw.
204. 821 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2016).
205. Id. at 342.
206. United States v. De Sapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“[I]t is apparent
that the words ‘uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce’ were intended to embrace
telephone calls made only in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
207. Id.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012).
209. The relevant language in the murder-for-hire statute is as follows: “uses or causes
another . . . to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. The relevant
language in the Travel Act is as follows: “uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012).
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1. United States v. Weathers
Jeffrey Eugene Weathers had state charges pending against him, and he
wanted the police sergeant who was going to testify against him to be
killed.210 To accomplish this, Weathers enlisted an intermediary to introduce
him to a hitman.211 Unbeknownst to him, though, the person he asked for
help—Renee Deckard—was already working with law enforcement officers
to help them bolster their charges against Weathers.212 Deckard agreed to
help Weathers, and she surreptitiously recorded a conversation about the
murder plot.213 Deckard also helped arrange a meeting between Weathers
and Detective Dan Peterson, who was undercover as a drug dealer and
hitman.214 The first meeting took place at a hotel in Kentucky and was
videotaped.215 A few days later, Weathers, Deckard, and Peterson met again
at a hotel in Kentucky, but in the interim Weathers and Peterson spoke
independent of Deckard over the phone.216 At the second meeting, Weathers
supplied Peterson with a gun to carry out the murder, and he was promptly
arrested.217
At Weathers’s trial for violating the murder-for-hire statute, Weathers
moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the government failed to prove the
interstate nexus.218 His argument was simple: since all of the meetings took
place in Kentucky and all of the phone calls were placed within Kentucky,
there was no interstate element to give the federal government jurisdiction.219
The district court noted that if the government was able to show that the
search signal used in the cellphone calls between Weathers and Peterson so
much as crossed state lines, this would satisfy the interstate requirement.220
The government called a cell site location expert who worked for Weathers’s
cellphone provider, and that expert explained that interstate paging signals
were, in fact, used to locate Weathers’s cellphone.221 Accordingly, Weathers
was found guilty, and he appealed to the circuit court.
The Sixth Circuit harped on a discrepancy in the language of the murderfor-hire statute. At the time, the text of § 1958(a) used the language “facility
in interstate commerce” whereas § 1958(b)(2), the definition section, defined
the phrase “facility of interstate commerce.”222 The court explained that this
difference was material: “in” implied that the actual use needed to be
interstate whereas “of” implied that the facility merely needed interstate
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340.
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capabilities.223 While the district court was inclined to chalk this discrepancy
up as congressional oversight—especially because two courts in the Southern
District of New York had reached opposite conclusions on the issue224—the
circuit court disagreed. It found that “the key prohibition creating the
criminal offense is found in subsection (a) and that it controls over the
provision in subsection (b), which, after all, merely defines an otherwise nonexistent term.”225
In holding that § 1958(a)’s language—“facility in interstate commerce”—
controls, the court found that there needed to be actual interstate activity and
that wholly intrastate actions would not suffice.226 Here, even though
Weathers’s phone calls were placed and received within the state of
Kentucky, since the cellphone provider paged his phone from Indiana, the
interstate element was satisfied.227 The court, nonetheless, added an
important caveat:
We would be remiss, however, if we failed to point out that the intent of
Congress, as expressed in the inconsistent provisions in § 1958(a) and
(b)(2), is far from clear. Moreover, this lack of clarity has not only made
resolution of the instant case unnecessarily difficult, but will pose even
thornier questions as communications that appear to be carried on intra
state are increasingly transmitted by satellite and other obviously
“interstate” facilities. We can only express the hope that future
amendments to the statute will obviate our current difficulty.228

This discrepancy was rectified in a 2004 amendment to the statute.
Following this amendment by Congress, both sections now use the
preposition “of.”229
2. United States v. Marek
At a Western Union in Houston, Texas, Louise Marek wired $500 to an
undercover FBI agent who was posing as a hitman because she wanted her
boyfriend’s lover dead.230 Western Union unquestionably has the ability to
wire money across the United States (and beyond), which renders it a facility
of interstate commerce.231 There was no evidence, however, that Marek’s
223. Id. at 341. Interestingly, the Weathers court cited the Travel Act, id. at 340, as the
Sixth Circuit also did in its decision in United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1989),
to highlight the distinction between “in” and “of”—and reiterated that under the Travel Act,
“of which the current murder-for-hire statute was originally a subset,” the preposition “in”
requires actual interstate activity, Weathers, 169 F.3d at 341.
224. Compare United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), with
United States v. Stevens, 842 F. Supp. 96, 97–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
225. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 342–43.
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012). This amendment seems to render Weathers moot. Since
the “in” language has been replaced with “of,” it appears that any use of an interstate facility
now satisfies the murder-for-hire statute in the Sixth Circuit.
230. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
231. Id. at 314.
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wire transfer crossed state lines before it was received in Harlingen, Texas.232
Thus, the Fifth Circuit was tasked with determining whether wholly intrastate
use of a facility of interstate commerce satisfies the jurisdictional
requirement of the federal murder-for-hire statute.233
A Fifth Circuit panel initially heard Marek’s case, and it was asked to
decide whether her guilty plea should have been accepted by the district
court.234 Though that panel was divided, it affirmed her conviction and held
that intrastate use of an interstate facility is enough to satisfy the murder-forhire statute.235 Around the same time, however, a different Fifth Circuit
panel, in dicta, suggested the opposite: the facility must actually be used in
an interstate manner.236 To “reconcile these differences and announce a
consistent position for th[e] Circuit, [the Fifth Circuit] voted to rehear both
cases en banc.”237
To approach the issue, the court started with the language of the statute.
In doing so, it declared that the “key question” was whether the term “in
interstate or foreign commerce” modified the verb “use” or the noun
“facility.”238 By applying the rule of proximity, the court found that the
phrase modified the noun “facility,” which was the more natural reading.239
Next, the court transitioned to the statutory context, where it noted that the
Travel Act was amended to clarify that it applied to intrastate mailings.240
Since Congress used the same language that was used in the murder-for-hire
statute, the en banc panel found that “logic dictates that precisely the same
wording [in the Travel Act and the murder-for-hire statute] must apply
equally to intrastate use of other interstate facilities, such as Western
Union.”241
In wrapping up its decision, the Marek court made a few more maneuvers
that judges handling Travel Act cases have also made. For example, the court
found that the phrases “in” and “of” were used by Congress interchangeably
without any significant difference between the two.242 In so finding, as has
232. Id. at 313.
233. Id. at 315.
234. United States v. Marek, 198 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1999), affirmed on reh’g, 238 F.3d 310
(5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Marek’s appeal suggested that the court improperly accepted her
plea because she admitted to an act that did not satisfy the legal elements of the murder-forhire statute (namely the interstate element).
235. Id. at 533.
236. United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000).
237. Marek, 238 F.3d at 313.
238. Id. at 316. Indeed, this is the same question that many courts have looked to when
deciding how best to interpret the Travel Act.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 318.
241. Id. There was, however, a dissent from the en banc decision. There, five judges
argued against such a reading, noting that the postal service was “inherently federal in nature,”
so it should be treated differently. Id. at 327 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent
expressed concern that every murder-for-hire would be federal under the majority’s view
because it is nearly impossible to commit such a crime without using either a phone or car. Id.
at 326.
242. Id. at 320 (majority opinion). This is in stark contrast to how the Sixth Circuit
approached this distinction in Weathers. See generally United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d
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been done with the Travel Act, the court looked at the legislative history
where Congress seem to carelessly switch between the two prepositions.243
Moreover, the court dismissed the notion that the rule of lenity should apply
by explaining that the statute was not ambiguous (despite needing roughly
ten pages to make that point).244 Finally, the court dismissed the concern that
the statute unconstitutionally usurped a power reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment.245
3. Post-Amendment Interpretations of the Murder-for-Hire Statute
After Marek and the subsequent 2004 amendment to the murder-for-hire
statute that changed the preposition in § 1958(a) from “in” to “of,” two other
circuits have also concluded that the statute was meant to cover any use of a
facility of interstate commerce regardless of whether that use was, in fact,
interstate. And, as discussed above, this amendment appears to have
rendered the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Weathers moot.
In United States v. Perez,246 a case of first impression, the Second Circuit
had to decide “whether a defendant can be convicted of using a facility in
interstate commerce with the intent that a murder-for-hire be committed
when the defendant’s use of that facility is wholly intrastate.”247 There, Jose
Antonio Perez was accused of helping to facilitate the killing of a rival gang
drug dealer.248 Perez placed wholly intrastate phone calls within the state of
Connecticut to lure the victim to a garage where a hitman waited.249 Perez
argued that these intrastate calls were not enough to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of the murder-for-hire statute.250
The court, however, found that the phone company Perez used provided
its customers with the ability to make interstate phone calls, which rendered
it a facility of interstate commerce.251 The Second Circuit sided with the
Fifth Circuit, in Marek,252 and Seventh Circuit, in United States v.
Richeson,253 which had both held that wholly intrastate use of an interstate
facility does satisfy the murder-for-hire statute.254

336 (6th Cir. 1999). There, the Weathers court based its entire opinion on the nuanced
difference between the prepositions “in” and “of.” See supra Part II.B.1.
243. Marek, 238 F.3d at 322.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 414 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
247. Id. at 303.
248. Id. at 302.
249. Id. at 303.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 304.
253. 338 F.3d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
254. In siding with these two circuits, however, the court noted there was a “circuit split.”
Marek, 238 F.3d at 304. This, as noted above, seems to be somewhat inaccurate. The only
circuit that appeared to hold the opposite of Marek was the Sixth Circuit in Weathers. See
United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999). That court’s decision, however,
appears moot based on the 2004 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1958.
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The Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v.
Mandel.255 Robert Mandel was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 for trying
to have his business partner, Konstantinos Antoniou, murdered.256 The
interstate nexus came from two different interstate facilities: a cellphone and
an automobile.257 Mandel had enlisted one of his employees, Patrick Dwyer,
to help conceive and facilitate the plot to kill Antoniou.258 Dwyer, however,
reported this solicitation to law enforcement, and he worked with the FBI to
prevent the scheme.259 For several months, Mandel and Dwyer discussed the
plan over the phone and in Mandel’s car.260 There is no evidence in the
record, however, that any phone call or drive occurred outside of the Chicago
area; instead, it appears that all these discussions took place wholly within
the state of Illinois. Still, the court had no problem finding that Mandel
violated the murder-for-hire statute.261
In so finding, the court noted that it previously settled this issue in
Richeson.262 There, even before the 2004 amendment that changed the
language in § 1958(a) to “facility of interstate commerce,” the Seventh
Circuit held that wholly intrastate activity can satisfy the murder-for-hire
statute.263 Every circuit that has decided whether entirely intrastate use of an
interstate facility can satisfy the murder-for-hire statute since the 2004
amendment has held that it does. Should this development, however,
influence how the Travel Act is treated?
4. What the Murder-for-Hire Statute May Mean for the Travel Act
While the Travel Act and the murder-for-hire statute have been called
“companion statute[s],”264 they are nevertheless “worded differently.”265 In
fact, after the 2004 amendment to the murder-for-hire statute, there is a stark
difference between the two pieces of legislation: the murder-for-hire statute
now contains the language “facility of interstate commerce”266 whereas the
Travel Act uses the verbiage “facility in interstate commerce.”267 While
some courts have dismissed this disparity in prepositions as insignificant,268
other courts have placed great import on the nuance.269

255. 647 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011).
256. Id. at 722–23.
257. Id. at 712.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 713.
261. Id. at 723.
262. Id. at 721.
263. United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 2003). The court relied heavily
on the Marek decision to reach this conclusion, with which it “wholly agree[d].” Id. at 660.
264. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 326 (5th Cir. 2001) (Grady, J., dissenting).
265. United States v. Varbaro, 597 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
266. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2012) (emphasis added).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (emphasis added).
268. See United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2008).
269. See United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999).
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With the difference in language, it is hard to definitively state that these
similar statutes ought to be treated the same way. This is especially true
given how concerned the Weathers court was with deciding whether the
intrastate use of an interstate facility satisfied the statute given the preamendment difference in language between § 1958(a) and § 1958(b).270 To
skirt this issue, the Nader court argued that, by titling the 2004 murder-forhire statute amendment a “definitional clarification,” Congress was actually
staking out a position about the “in” versus “of” language—specifically, it
was taking the stance that the these two words are interchangeable.271
The Nader argument, however, had to go a step further to set up its holding
by discussing how related statutes can be interpreted harmoniously.272 This,
then, allowed the court to ignore the securities statutes because they were not
closely related to the Travel Act.273
This multistep analysis may well be persuasive, but no other court has
relied on it. Moreover, there is still the hurdle that the language of the two
statutes is not identical. This, then, may be reason enough to reject treating
the intrastate use of an interstate facility under the Travel Act the same as it
is treated under the murder-for-hire statute. This would not necessarily
preclude finding that the intrastate use of an interstate facility suffices; it
would just require an alternative analytical basis.
III. WHY THE TRAVEL ACT SHOULD COVER INTRASTATE USE OF
INTERSTATE FACILITIES
Without being able to rely with any degree of certainty on extending a
reading of the murder-for-hire statute to apply to the Travel Act, it is unclear
whether courts will find that the intrastate use of an interstate facility can
satisfy the Travel Act. This Part starts by analyzing potential reasons why
more courts have not reached this issue. It then proceeds to explain why
courts that do reach this issue should find that wholly intrastate use does
satisfy the Act. Finally, this Part explains why such a holding is not as
problematic as it may initially appear.
A. Why More Courts Have Not Decided This Issue
The mere notion that any wholly intrastate use of an everyday facility of
interstate commerce such as an ATM, car, or cellphone could satisfy the
interstate element of the Travel Act seems, at least at first blush, wholly
inappropriate. And, as such, one would expect to find a plethora of case law
surrounding this concern. But only one circuit has addressed this issue,274
and it did so in 2008.275 Why is this seldom an issue before the courts? While

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 342–43.
Nader, 542 F.3d at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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there is no straightforward answer, there are a few possible explanations—
none, however, is truly satisfying.
Perhaps one explanation why more courts have not decided this issue is
that the Travel Act is not being used by federal prosecutors as frequently as
it once was, which renders this issue less prominent. This, however, is simply
not true. In 2017 alone, eighty-seven cases cited the Travel Act.276 Given
the exorbitantly high plea rate,277 it is likely that these eighty-seven cases are
not fully representative of the Act’s use.
One such example of federal prosecutors still using the Travel Act is
United States v. Asaro,278 where the Eastern District of New York secured a
guilty plea from Vincent Asaro, a longtime member of the Bonanno crime
family, by charging him under the Travel Act. Notably, that case had two
“interstate” facility hooks: a car and a telephone. The federal prosecutors
were able to secure a guilty plea279 even though there was no clear indication
that the use of the car or phone ever crossed state lines.280 Though the Asaro
case is merely one example, it supports a larger point—the Travel Act is by
no means extinct.
In fact, there is even some speculation that the Travel Act is poised to make
a comeback of sorts. Some have argued that the Travel Act may become
relevant in the realm of health-care fraud and kickback schemes.281 Others
have pointed out that the Travel Act has been used to charge corruption in
the wake of two Supreme Court decisions that limited the utility of other
federal corruption statutes.282 It seems, therefore, that the Travel Act is not
obsolete, so this does not provide a satisfactory answer to why more circuits
have not decided whether the intrastate use of an interstate facility is enough
to satisfy the Travel Act.
A second potential explanation for why more circuits have not decided this
issue is that the Travel Act only carries a maximum prison term of five years
276. This figure comes from a Westlaw search conducted on Oct. 8, 2018. While some of
these cases merely mention the Travel Act, a majority of them deal squarely with Travel Act
charges.
277. See generally LINDSAY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE
BARGAINING (2011), http://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7S2L-BEWD].
278. No. 17-CR-00127-ARR, 2017 WL 8315759 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2017); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Long-Time Bonanno Crime Family Member Sentenced to 96
Months’ Imprisonment for Arson (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/
long-time-bonanno-crime-family-member-sentenced-96-months-imprisonment-arson
[https://perma.cc/U575-U292].
279. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 278.
280. The plea minutes only demonstrate that, after a high-speed road-rage incident, Asaro
used a phone to set up the arson. The presumption appears to be that this all took place within
New York. See Letter from Richard P. Donaghue at 1–2, United States v. Rullan, No. 17-127
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018), ECF No. 143.
281. Jonathan S. Feld et al., The Rise of the Travel Act, L.J. NEWSLETTERS (Oct. 2017),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/10/01/the-rise-ofthe-travel-act/ [https://perma.cc/W3SJ-XMV8].
282. Elizabeth H. Capel & Brandon D. Fox, Gov’t Use of Travel Act to Charge Corruption
Might Backfire, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=413f97a1-b285-4464-b647-71dccd8f974c [https://perma.cc/K8LD-E49U].
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(provided there is no act of violence involved),283 so it is not a headlinegrabbing criminal charge. This explanation, however, is predicated on at
least three assumptions. First, it rests on the presumption that federal
prosecutors base the crimes they charge on whether they would make the
news. This is a cynical view, and one that is not supported by any empirical
data.284 Second, it is based on the notion that federal prosecutors would not
otherwise use the Travel Act as a main criminal charge. This, too, has no
statistical support.285 Third, it relies on courts having discretion in which
cases they decide. While this is certainly true for the Supreme Court,286
district and circuit courts must hear federal cases within their jurisdiction,
with few exceptions.287
Thus, this is no explanation for why more circuits have not decided
whether the intrastate use of interstate facilities satisfies the Travel Act. The
idea that the maximum sentence provisions in the Travel Act have somehow
limited the utility of this statute is simply not true. Not only is a five-year
maximum sentence nothing to scoff at, but there is also a mechanism in the
statute that makes any crime that involved a violent act punishable by up to
twenty years in prison.288
A third potential explanation for why more courts have not decided this
issue is that mandatory minimum sentencing requirements have led to more
defendants taking plea deals, which prevents courts from reaching the merits
of such cases. This is not a sufficient answer either. First, since 2010, federal
prosecutors have charged crimes carrying mandatory minimums less
frequently.289 Though this does not in and of itself dispel this explanation—
over 21 percent of charged federal offenses, after all, carry mandatory
minimum sentences290—a second, more compelling fact does: the Travel
Act does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence. While a Travel Act
charge can certainly be coupled with offenses that do carry such minimums,
when charged alone there is no added pressure that a judge will have to

283. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2012). If a crime of violence is involved, however, the Travel
Act carries a maximum prison sentence of twenty years. Id.
284. While there is no such support for this idea, there is some support that indicates federal
prosecutors may “overcharge” defendants, which allows them to gain the upper hand in a
criminal prosecution—the more charges that are brought, the more likely the defendant is to
plead guilty. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 868 (1995).
285. See supra Part III.A.1.
286. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
287. Assuming the litigants have standing, there is a controversy that is not moot, and the
federal court has jurisdiction, the case will likely be justiciable. Though there is the political
question doctrine, which can prevent a court from hearing an issue, see, for example, Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), this doctrine is not implicated by the Travel Act.
288. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1)–(a)(3)(B) (2012).
289. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf
[https://perma.cc/887J-YCWT]. These statistics, however, cover President Obama’s
presidency; it is possible that these numbers will surge during President Trump’s presidency.
290. Id.
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sentence a guilty defendant to a lengthy prison term. Therefore, a defendant
challenging the breadth of the Travel Act’s jurisdiction would have less
pressure to accept a plea deal since the Travel Act does not carry on its own
a mandatory minimum sentence. Again, this reason falls short in explaining
why more courts have not reached this issue.
Finally, perhaps this issue is just not of great concern, so it is not often
litigated. This is both the most likely and least satisfying explanation.
It is the most likely explanation because the lack of case law is partial
evidence that courts are not faced with this issue often. As noted, this precise
issue has only ever been decided by one circuit court, and that was in 2008.291
That holding, while cited around seventy times, has never been used by a
court at the circuit or district level to uphold or strike down a Travel Act
charge. It is certainly possible, then, that this issue does not arise frequently
enough to warrant great national concern.
This is also the least satisfying explanation. It may also be true that
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts are all comfortable with allowing
the intrastate use of an interstate facility to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of the Travel Act. This, then, would render this issue moot. But
there is some indication that this may be of national interest and that potential
defendants may not be so willing to concede federal jurisdiction. After all,
as the Internet of Things292 burgeons, more and more everyday devices may
be deemed facilities in interstate commerce.
B. Why Intrastate Use of an Interstate Facility Should Satisfy
the Travel Act
There are at least three reasons courts should allow the Travel Act’s
jurisdictional hook to be satisfied even when the use of an interstate facility
of commerce only occurs intrastate.
First, the Travel Act’s constitutional hook is the Commerce Clause.293 At
the time the Act was codified, Supreme Court jurisprudence permitted the
Commerce Clause to reach intrastate activity.294 Even today, where the
Court is less deferential than it once was, Congress can still regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.295 Moreover,
Congress can also regulate any activity—local or national in nature—if it
substantially impacts interstate commerce.296
While there is no debate whether Congress had authority to enact the
Travel Act, there is some uncertainty surrounding whether Congress intended
for the Travel Act to extend to wholly intrastate activity.297 At the time the
291. See United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 2008).
292. The Internet of Things describes everyday items that are able to collect data and send
those pieces of information to the internet.
293. See supra Part I.A.
294. See supra notes 34–48 and accompanying text.
295. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
296. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
297. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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Travel Act was enacted in 1961, society was certainly different than it is
today. While this might appear to be compelling enough to sway a court to
limit the reach of the Act, this would ignore the reality of both the time of the
statute’s codification and of today. Prior to the Travel Act being signed into
law, there was already an interstate highway system underway.298 Congress
was well aware of the ease with which people were able to move from state
to state; in fact, this was a motivating factor of the Act’s passage.299 Thus, it
would be a mischaracterization to contend that society is so different that
Congress could not have foreseen cars being considered an instrumentality
of interstate commerce.
A slightly better argument is that Congress certainly did not foresee
cellphones being as pervasive as they are today, but this argument is only
somewhat more compelling. Though it is certainly true that Congress did not
envision a world of cellphones—the first cellphone was not used until
1973300—it is not as though there were no long-distance calls in the early
1960s. In fact, Attorney General Kennedy even expressed concern about
bookmakers using phones to establish a national network of support for each
other.301 So, while the pervasive use of cellphones certainly was not
considered by Congress, it considered that cars traveled state to state and
phones were capable of placing long-distance calls. All this indicates that
while society is different than it was when the Travel Act was enacted,
enough similarities exist to demonstrate that it is not too great of a stretch to
find that Congress wanted the Act to be far-reaching.
Second, the legislative history further indicates Congress’s intent to create
a far-reaching statute. While courts have placed a varying degree of weight
on the legislative history of the Travel Act302 and this has led to competing
interpretations of the scope of the Act,303 the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the Act to be broad as it was addressing the national
problem of organized crime. And, despite the Act’s narrow title,304 members
of Congress expressed a clear desire to make the Act as broad as possible305
by successfully lobbying to add more expansive language when the Act was
being reviewed.306 Part of Congress’s desire to broaden the language was its
298. See 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
299. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
300. Zachary M. Seward, The First Mobile Phone Call Was Made 40 Years Ago Today,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/04/the-firstmobile-phone-call-was-made-40-years-ago-today/274611/ [https://perma.cc/PBX9-2P2Y].
301. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 3.
302. See supra notes 120–52 and accompanying text.
303. Compare United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1986) (relying on the
legislative history to hold that the intrastate use of the mails is enough to invoke federal
jurisdiction under the Travel Act), with United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1989)
(relying on the legislative history to hold that the use of the mails must be interstate in nature).
304. In United States v. Smith, the court, in one of the first cases to discuss the scope of the
Travel Act, explained that the statute was intended to be read more broadly than its title
indicated. 209 F. Supp. 907, 916 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
305. See supra notes 90–119 and accompanying text.
306. In fact, shortly after the Travel Act was passed, the Supreme Court affirmed that
Congress intended for the statute to be broad in scope. In United States v. Nardello, the Court
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fear that criminals would find a way around the reach of the Act.307 In fact,
even though it ended up being broader than it was in its proposed form, there
was still fear within Congress that the Act was too narrow.308
This is not to say that the Travel Act’s scope is infinite. There is certainly
an argument to be made that intrastate use of interstate facilities is beyond
the scope of the Act.309 But such a reading would limit a statute that was
written with broad language and was intended to be far-reaching. Attorney
General Kennedy even pointed out that organized crime may appear to be
local in character when it really is not. This is further strengthened by
Senator Keating’s concern that criminals would figure out a workaround if
the Act was written too narrowly.310 Finally, the language of the Act is
unarguably broad, and, though it has been amended several times, the
language has never been restricted.
Third, the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to decide whether intrastate use
of a phone can satisfy the Travel Act, has held that an expansive reading of
the Travel Act is permissible.311 This holding is nearly a decade old, and it
has never been challenged within or without the circuit. Moreover, the
opinion is quite thoughtful; it breaks down the legislative history of the Act,
analyzes the text of the Act, and demonstrates why the Act should be
interpreted analogously with the murder-for-hire statute. Though Nader is
only persuasive authority in other circuits, the Ninth Circuit rooted its
analysis in case law from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits.312 Nader is a sound opinion that reflects the reality of interstate
commerce; as such, future courts that hear similar cases should use it as a
guide.
C. Applying the Travel Act to Intrastate Activity Is Not Worrisome
While at first blush allowing the federal government to prosecute wholly
intrastate activity using a statute predicated on interstate facilities may be
disconcerting, this should not be terribly worrisome.

opted to read the enumerated crime of extortion broadly, allowing the act to pertain to more
than just extortion involving public officials. 393 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1969).
307. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
309. No circuit has made this argument outright, but the Second Circuit has come close to
implying it. For example, in United States v. Archer, the Second Circuit held that the federal
government may not manufacture federal jurisdiction by enticing a would-be defendant to
make an interstate phone call. 486 F.2d 670, 681–83 (2d Cir. 1973). There, federal agents
traveled from New York to New Jersey to ensure that there was a multistate phone call. Id. at
673–74. Impliedly, the court acknowledged that an intrastate phone call in and of itself did
not suffice to satisfy the Travel Act; otherwise, why would the federal agents manufacture
jurisdiction by traveling across state lines when there were already intrastate phone calls?
Nevertheless, it would be a far stretch to call this law in the Second Circuit. A recent guilty
plea reveals that intrastate activity seems to satisfy the Travel Act. See supra note 278 and
accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
311. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2008).
312. Id. at 718.
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1. The Potential Harm Is Minimal
The most compelling argument against an expansive reading of the Travel
Act is that such a reading would allow the federal government to usurp state
police power. This contention, however, is unpersuasive. Kennedy made it
clear that the Act was to be used to aid and assist local law enforcement, not
take over its power. Moreover, it is not in federal prosecutors’ interest to
attempt to take over state prosecutions as they have large caseloads and there
are already many opportunities to charge federal crimes. Federal prosecutors
are not looking for ways to dominate all prosecutions; there is plenty of
federal crime occupying their work. The Travel Act is merely a mechanism
by which the federal government can assist states in preventing illegal
activity.313
A second argument concerns overcriminalization.314 Critics have long
argued that there are too many federal crimes, a situation which often turns
average citizens into federal prisoners.315 Scholars have even argued that
overly broad federal statutes ought to be read narrowly to prevent
overcriminalization.316 While there is certainly a danger in having farreaching statutes that criminalize otherwise innocent individuals, this is
simply not at issue with a jurisdictionally broad reading of the Travel Act.
One cannot trip and fall into a Travel Act violation. The enumerated crimes
in the act—prostitution, arson, extortion, among others—are not crimes that
one accidentally commits. These crimes have a mens rea requirement. Thus,
individuals who are prosecuted under the Travel Act are not the same
individuals who raise overcriminalization concerns.
2. The Potential Benefits Are Maximal
While the potential for harm is minimal, an expansive reading of the Travel
Act might be quite beneficial.
First, the Act has recently been used in health-care antifraud
enforcement.317 While thus far these enforcement actions have not
313. There is also some support for the notion that federal prosecutors are cautious
regarding the jurisdictional hook when bringing Travel Act cases and that they charge cases
carefully to avoid overstepping their authority. See PETER J. HENNING, THE PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 1–7 (2017).
314. Overcriminalization is the excessive legislation of criminal laws. This is different
from federalization, which is where state crimes are converted into federally chargeable
offenses.
315. See, e.g., Brian Walsh & Benjamin Keane, Overcriminalization and the Constitution,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/
overcriminalization-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/ESY7-FL25]; Brian W. Walsh,
You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 28, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/youre-probably-federal-criminal
[https://perma.cc/K5QM-92HZ].
316. See generally Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012).
317. See Indictment, United States v. Beauchamp, No. 16-cr-00516-D (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
2016), ECF No. 1; Plea Agreement, United States v. Aponte, No. 13-cr-00464 (D.N.J. June
12, 2013), ECF No. 4.
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implicated the jurisdictional component of the Travel Act, it is not a far
stretch to imagine a situation in which a state health-care provider uses a
facility in interstate commerce in an intrastate manner to further a kickback
scheme in the era of the Affordable Care Act.318 Given that the federal
government has an interest in ensuring that its health-care program is not
being used to promote fraud,319 allowing the Travel Act to prevent such a
harm should be welcomed. Scholars have long discussed the benefits of
allowing such prosecutions,320 and they have concluded that a kickback
scheme—whereby doctors receive compensation for steering patients toward
particular medical treatments—is analogous to bribery.321 Thus, it is
possible to prevent health-care fraud using the Travel Act, and therefore the
broader the Act is interpreted, the better.
Second, the Travel Act gives federal prosecutors reasonable flexibility in
charging crimes that might otherwise go unpunished. For example, when
Michael Vick was indicted for running a dogfighting operation,322 he was
charged under the Travel Act.323 Though Vick’s prosecution was not without
its critics,324 it raised awareness about dogfighting325 and helped clean up an
otherwise unregulated industry.326 Also within the realm of sports, the
Travel Act was recently used to arrest individuals involved in a college
basketball bribery scheme.327 Such examples demonstrate the legitimate
318. See generally Kate Pickert, Scams, Fraud Among Obamacare Concerns, TIME (Aug.
6, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/08/06/more-obamacare-worries-scams-and-insurancethats-really-not/ [https://perma.cc/ZB6T-SCFK].
319. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement
Efforts Recover Record $4 Billion; New Affordable Care Act Tools Will Help Fight Fraud
(Jan.
24,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-fraud-prevention-andenforcement-efforts-recover-record-4-billion-new-affordable
[https://perma.cc/DHF5CCSA].
320. See generally, e.g., James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback
Statute: New Entities, New Theories in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH L. 167
(2007).
321. Id. at 189.
322. Falcons’ Vick Indicted by Grand Jury in Dogfighting Probe, ESPN (July 18, 2007),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2940065 [https://perma.cc/WP9D-L9R7].
323. Adam Harris Kurland, The Prosecution of Michael Vick: Of Dogfighting, Depravity,
Dual Sovereignty, and “A Clockwork Orange,” 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 465, 468 (2011).
324. Id. at 478 (arguing that prosecutorial guidelines should have stopped federal
prosecutors from charging the Vick case).
325. Matt Bershadker, Ten Years Later: How the Michael Vick Case Advanced the Cause
to End Dog Fighting, ASPCA (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.aspca.org/blog/ten-years-laterhow-michael-vick-case-advanced-cause-end-dog-fighting [https://perma.cc/S3GS-BQEA].
326. Vick, for example, supported legislation aimed at criminalizing spectators at animal
fighting events. Patrick Graves et al., 2011 Legislative and Administrative Review, 18 ANIMAL
L. 361, 366 (2012).
327. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney Announces the Arrest of 10
Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches, for College Basketball Fraud and Corruption
Schemes (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-announcesarrest-10-individuals-including-four-division-i-coaches-college
[https://perma.cc/G7CD55H7]. Moreover, the Travel Act has also been used in the FIFA corruption cases. M.V., How
America Is Pursuing FIFA, ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (June 1, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains
[https://perma.cc/UU7N-WJKP].
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range of the Travel Act. As a versatile criminal statute that is grounded in
clear criminal activity, the Travel Act’s jurisdictional requirement ought to
be interpreted broadly to permit it to clean up criminal enterprises that would
otherwise go unpunished.
CONCLUSION
While the Travel Act was enacted over sixty years ago with the distinct
purpose of combating organized crime, its broad language gives it utility
beyond that narrow focus. The Act prohibits the use of a “facility in interstate
commerce” to further one of the Act’s enumerated crimes. Only one circuit
court has decided the scope of this language as it pertains to the intrastate use
of an interstate facility, and it concluded that this sufficed to establish federal
jurisdiction under the Travel Act. Though this might seem like the federal
government overstepping its authority, this language should be read broadly.
Minimal harm can result from a broad jurisdictional reading of the Travel
Act, yet the potential benefits that may come from such an interpretation
justify it. The Travel Act has been used to prevent an array of crimes that
would have otherwise gone unpunished, and it will prove useful in, for
example, prosecuting health-care fraud in today’s society. This should give
courts reason enough to allow the intrastate use of an interstate facility to
satisfy the Act.

